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Budget contributions, EU  expenditure, budgetary balances and 
relative prosperity of the Member States 
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The purpose of this  note is  to  contribute to  the  current Agenda 2000  discussion by 
examining and analysing some important data relating to  the budgetary relationships 
between the EU and its Member States.  The note is organised around five  themes: 
section  one  recalls  the  context  in  which  the  Agenda  2000  proposals  have  been 
formulated;  section  two  reviews  and  discusses  recent  trends  in  Member  States' 
contribution to  the EU budget;  section three reviews trends  in EU expenditure and 
discusses  some  implications  of enlargement  for  budgetary  balances;  section  four 
reviews some methodological questions concerning the measurement and meaning of 
the budgetary balance concept;  and section five discusses trends in the Member States' 
contributive capacity and in their relative prosperity in recent years. 
1.  The context of the Agenda 2000 proposals 
In Edinburgh, the European Council decided a significant increase in the own resources 
ceiling:  from  1.20 per cent of the Union's GNP  to  1.27 per cent.  This decision was 
taken because of the need to  strengthen the cohesion effort in the perspective of EMU 
and as a result of  the desire to contribute more effectively to the transition taking place 
in Central and Eastern Europe.  At the time enlargement towards these countries was 
not yet seen as a realistic short term prospect. 
However, over the years 1993-1996, the Union has spent significantly less (almost 30 
billion Ecus over the four year period) than the payments appropriations voted in the 
budgets.  This was essentially due to  favourable world agricultural prices trends and 
some  underspending  in  structural  operations  linked  to  the  transition  to  a  new 
programming period.  More recently, a deliberate political effort to curb spending has 
resulted in very low increases in budgetary appropriations 
The  Agenda 2000  proposals  are  based on a  much  tighter  control  of EU spending. 
Whereas agricultural expenditure is expected to  continue to  be constrained by the so-
called "agricultural guideline"  (7 4  per cent  of the  nominal  increase  in  GNP),  other 
categories of expenditure will increase  much more modestly.  If the  Agenda 2000 
proposals are implemented, EU spending would not exceed  1.22 per cent of GNP in 
2006, with spending in the original 15 Member States being kept at 1.10 per cent (see 
chart  1  ).  The Edinburgh decisions  resulted in a Financial Perspective allowing  an 
increase in commitment appropriations of  31.6 per cene in real terms between 1992 and 
1999.  Agenda 2000, proposes a real increase in the same type of  appropriations of 17.1 
per cent between over the same time span (between 1999 and 2006) and including a first 
Including the effects of enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden. 
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wave of accessions half way through the period (excluding enlargement commitment 
appropriations increase by only 3.5 per cent in real terms between 1999 and 2006). 
2.  Trends in Member States' contributions 
Apart from "traditional own resources" (TOR), i.e. customs and agricultural duties and 
sugar levies, the Union's budget is financed through transfers based essentially on the 
amount of consumption taking place in each Member State (the VAT resource) and the 
total  amount  of income  at  its  disposal  (the  GNP  resource).  These  transfers  are 
calculated applying  a given percentage, identical for  all  Member States,  to  the VAT 
harmonised  base  and  to  GNP  expressed  in  national  currencies.  The  resulting 
contributions are also denominated in national currencies. 
2.1  Following the reforms of  1988 and 1992 the contributions of  the Member States 
have become more "equitable" •.. 
The VAT resource, however, by being a consumption tax, results in contributions which 
are regressive both for taxpayers and for Member States.  Moreover, as table 3 shows, 
there  are  systematic deviations between VAT  and  GNP  payments  in  some Member 
States, reflecting underlying structural differences or there may be temporary deviations, 
resulting from cyclical developments (e.g. the increase in the VAT base of Germany in 
1992-94). 
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In order to  ensure that contributions are more "equitable" (more correlated to  income, 
i. e. GNP), the reform of 1988, instead of  increasing the resources put at the disposal of 
the EU through an increase in the VAT rate, introduced a fourth resource based on GNP. 
The reform of 1992 went much further since it deliberately reduced the relative weight 
of  the VAT resource through a progressive reduction of  the maximum rate that could be 
called (from 1.4 per cent in  1994 to  1.0 in 1999) and the introduction of a system of 
upper limits to the harmonised VAT base of each Member State which will eventually 
limit it to no more than 50 per cent of  a country's GNP
2
• 
Table 1 
The composition of EU own resources 
(in per cent of the total, accrual basis) 
1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
TOR  27.6  29.2  29.9  26.8  24.3  21.3  19.7  20.9  19.7 
VAT  58.9  64.0  70.1  59.0  61.0  53.2  53.2  54.8  50.5 
GNP  13.5  6.8  0.0  14.2  14.7  25.5  27.1  24.3  29.8 
Source: Commission services 
The effects that these reforms have produced until now are shown by the data of  table 1. 
It is  clear that  whereas  the  relative  weight  of the  VAT  resource  had  declined  only 
modestly until  1995,  significant reductions took place in  1996  and in  1997.  In the 
current year, the relative weight of the VAT resource has declined to  less than 50 per 
cent of  total resources.  Further significant reductions are expected in 1998 and 1999 as 
the call rate will continue to decline and the generalised system of capping is likely to 
affect a greater number of  Member States. 
The progressive reduction in the weight of the VAT resource has increased the overall 
consistency between Member States contributions (excluding TOR) and their GNP, thus 
increasing the  "equity" of the system (see chart 2 and table  3).  In some countries, 
however,  the  reduction  in  the  relative  weight  of the  VAT  resource  has  not  been 
sufficiently large to completely offset an increase in the ratio of  the VAT base to GNP. 
This  is  particularly evident  in the  case  of Germany  where  the  VAT  base  increased 
significantly in 1992-94 as economic growth was largely driven by private consumption 
and was simultaneously accompanied by significant growth in imports.  In 1995  and 
1996,  however,  this  trend  was  reversed  and  the  German  VAT  base  has  remained 
practically constant whereas  the VAT  contribution actually declined in line with the 
reductions in the rate of call.  If in the years  ahead,  cyclical developments were to 
2  The VAT base was immediately limited to 50 per cent of GNP for Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece, whereas 
those of the other countries were be capped at 54 per cent in  1995 descending progressively to 50 per cent in 
1999. 
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increase again the VAT base of Germany relative to  GNP, this would not have again 
such an effect over the VAT payments of  this country, since the capping system would 
apply. 
Had EU spending increased as much as allowed by the Financial Perspective, the trend 
towards  greater alignment of contributions with GNP  shares  would have  been even 
more pronounced as all additional spending would have been financed through the GNP 
resource.  By 1999,  it is  expected  that  the  GNP  resource  will be by far  the most 
important one with a weight ofwell over 50 per cent against about 30 per cent for VAT. 
The relative weight of traditional own resources (TOR) has also declined significantly 
(from 28.7 per cent in 1989 to about 18 per cent in 1997.  In absolute terms TOR have 
remained broadly stable since 1990, fluctuating between Ecu 12 and 14 billion. 
2.2  And, after a significant increase between  1990 and 1996,  are now increasing 
more slowly. 
After a two year period of small increases in 1989  and  1990,  due to  lower financial 
needs  arising  from  a  significant  underspending  in  agriculture  (a  period  of very 
favourable world prices), Member States contributions
3 increased strongly in 1991  and 
3  In  this  paragraph  (and  in  chart  3),  total  contributions  are  taken  as  equal  to  total  payments;  they  therefore 
correspond to the effective withdrawals made by the Commission from its accounts with the national treasuries. 
This aggregate allows  a more  meaningful time series analysis since it is  not affected  by  the  utilisation of the 
surpluses from previous years. 
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Chart 3 
Own resources ceiling, financial perspective, total contributions 
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1992 as  the trend in agricultural markets was reversed.  1993-1996 saw again rapid 
increases,  often two-digits,  as  the  Edinburgh  decisions  on  the  increase  in structural 
spending  were  implemented.  During  this  period  contributions  reached  almost  the 
maximum allowed by the own resources ceiling.  This trend was interrupted in 1997 
following  the  decision  by  the  European  Institutions  to  accompany  the  budgetary 
consolidation efforts carried out in the Member States.  In 1998, spending is expected to 
continue  to  increase  moderately,  thus  leaving  a  substantial  margin  under  both  the 
Financial Perspective and the Own Resources ceiling (see chart 3). 
2.3  The  individual contributions of each  Member State  have increased above  or 
below the general trend depending on the changes in their rate of  growth. 
Different  rates  of  economic  growth  in  nominal  terms  can  increase  or  reduce 
substantially deviations from the general trend of total contributions.  Given that each 
country pays the same percentage of its VAT base or its GNP, the contributions of a 
country whose economy grows faster than the rest will also increase faster whereas the 
contrary will take place when relative economic growth slows down. 
Moreover,  exchange  rate  fluctuations  exert  a  significant  influence  on  changes  in 
contributions when these are expressed in a common currency (e.g. Ecus) even if they 
remain unaffected when denominated in national currencies. 
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The trend in actual contributions on a cash basis is further affected by the budgetary 
procedure according to  which the initial estimates entered into the budget of a given 
year be updated the following year on the basis of  the outturn for VAT and GNP.  This 
procedure often leads  to  an  amplification of the  swings resulting  from  the  economic 
cycle.  A country whose rate of growth is strong over a number of years will see its 
contributions  rising  in  line  with the  expansion of its  economy,  but will  also  pay a 
complement  on the  contribution  of the  previous  years  if,  as  it  is  likely  during  an 
upswing, its GNP and VAT base had been initially underestimated.  The contrary will 
happen during a protracted period of  weak and decelerating growth. 
The combined effect of these factors is sometimes to cause considerable fluctuations in 
Member States contributions expressed in Ecus.  For instance, the German contribution 
to  the  Community budget in Ecu increased by about  20 per cent a year on average 
between  1990  and  1994  whereas  it  practically  stagnated  between  1994  and  1996. 
Italy's payments to  the EU budget in Ecu declined by 24 per cent in  1994,  declined 
again by 17 per cent in 1995 and increased by 40 per cent in 1996.  These data are to be 
appreciated against average increases in overall contributions of  about 12 per cent a year 
between 1990 and 1994 and of  almost 6.5 per cent a year between 1994 and 1997. 
The contributions of  the Member States to the EU  budget are roughly proportional to 
their GNP and they ought therefore to be seen as broadly "fair". 
3.  Trends in EU expenditure in Member States 
EU expenditure reflects policy priorities in the following areas : 
i)  the Structural Operations which is explicitly redistributive between countries and 
should therefore result in very large differences between the relative size of each 
Member State's economy (and therefore its share in the financing of  the EU budget) 
and its share in this type of  expenditure; and 
ii)  the  Common Agricultural Policy which is  redistributive  between sectors  of the 
economy and produces a distribution of  budgetary spending among countries which 
depends  on  the  choices  made  by  the  Union  in  this  sector  and  bears  little 
resemblance with the financing shares (see table 5). 
In  1996,  structural  spending represented  32  per cent of total  spending  and the  CAP 
represented 51  per cent.  The so called "internal policies" (research and development, 
energy,  transport,  education,  etc.)  represented 6 per cent,  external and  administrative 
expenditure represented about 5 per cent each. 
Give  the  predominance  of the  two  main  categories  of expenditure,  EU  spending  is 
distributed very unevenly across Member States and this naturally influences budgetary 
positions.  The uneven distribution of  spending is the implicit result of  deliberate policy 
decisions. 
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In  coming  years,  EU spending,  and  its  distribution  among  Member  States,  will  be 
significantly affected by enlargement.  Given that the applicant countries all have low 
levels  of relative  prosperity,  they  should  be  expected  to  be  large  beneficiaries  of 
spending  under  the  Structural  Funds.  At  the  same  time,  the  proposed  reform  of 
structural actions will lead to a greater concentration of  interventions which may affect 
the distribution of  spending among the current 15 Member States. 
Table 2 
Member States' shares in EU financing and in spending under 
the CAP and structural operations 
(1996, percentage shares in the EU total, cash figures) 
B  DK  D  G  E  F  IR  I  L  NL  A  p  Fl  s  UK 
R  L  N 
Financing 
Total  3.9  1.9  29.  1.6  6.4  17.  1.0  12.  0.2  6.2  2.6  1.2  1.4  2.8  11. 
2  5  7  6 
of 
which  3.1  1.9  30.  1.7  6.8  18.  0.8  13.  0.2  4.9  2.8  1.3  1.4  2.8  9.6 
VAT/GN  0  9  8 
p 
TOR  7.3  2.0  25.  1.1  4.6  11.  1.5  7.7  0.1  11.  1.9  1.0  1.1  2.8  19. 
8  4  9  9 
Spending 
Total  3.1  2.3  14.  7.6  15.  17.  4.4  11.  0.2  3.0  2.4  5.4  1.5  1.9  8.8 
(1)  8  6  7  4 
of 
which  2.9  3.5  15.  7.2  10.  24.  4.4  10.  0.1  3.9  3.1  1.7  1.7  1.6  8.9 
CAP  5  4  5  8 
Structur  1.8  0.4  14.  9.1  25.  8.0  4.9  12.  0.1  1.1  1.1  12.  0.6  0.5  8.0 
al  0  8  4  0 
(1) Total  operational expenditure.  See also Table 7 
Less significant on the distribution of  spending among Member States will be the effects 
of the CAP reforms which has been proposed by the Commission in its Agenda 2000 
communication, but which is independent of  enlargement. 
Current EU spending is shaped by the decisions taken in 1992 (increase in structural 
spending and CAP reform).  Over the period covered by Agenda 2000,  expenditure 
will be modified by enlargement and the proposed reforms of  the Community policies. 
Current and prospective EU budgetary imbalances of the Member States  are  the 
result of the explicit political choices made when  determining the most important 
Community policies. 
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4.  Problems with measuring and interpreting budgetary balances 
Budgetary  balances,  i. e.  the  difference  between  budget  contributions  and  budget 
expenditure received by each Member States, while appealing in their simplicity either 
invariably misrepresent or are inadequate measures of the benefits from membership in 
the EU. 
Budgetary  flows  do  not  capture  all  the  benefits  from  membership  in  the  EU.  EU 
membership,  which  gives  rise  to  financial  and  non-financial  advantages  as  well  as 
obligations,  has  a  non-budgetary  dimension  the  importance  of which  dwarfs  the 
budgetary one.  For example, the benefits from the pursuit of common objectives, such 
as trade liberalisation and European economic integration, cannot be evaluated in terms 
of  budgetary flows alone.  Moreover, flows from the EU budget invariably benefit not 
only recipients but other Member States in the form of return flows;  typical examples 
are  structural  funds  and  external  expenditure,  where  the  implementation of projects 
often gives rise to purchases of  goods and services from other Member States. 
Conventionally measured budgetary balances fail to adequately represent the benefits of 
EU membership for at least three reasons: 
•  first, recorded budgetary flows fail to account for positive externalities arising from 
EU policies;  for  example,  CAP,  structural  operations  and  external  expenditure 
benefit not only the  immediate recipients but also  give  rise  to  spill-over effects 
transcending national borders; 
•  secondly,  there  are  often  difficulties  associated  with  the  identification  of the 
ultimate beneficiaries of EU expenditure policies;  for example, CAP expenditure 
on export restitution may be recorded as allocated to the member state from which 
goods are exported when in fact the ultimate beneficiaries are the producers in other 
member states;  another example can be derived from research expenditure where 
multinational consortia ask for  EU payments to  be made to  one member of the 
consortium or to a bank account opened in Belgium or Luxembourg; 
•  and,  thirdly,  EU budget  expenditure  is  heterogeneous  and  comparisons  of total 
amounts received are often meaningless in appreciating the "benefit" resulting from 
such payments.  Transfers  under the  structural operations increase the resources 
available  in  recipient  countries  by  the  exact  amount  of the  recorded  payment 
(although  significant  spillovers  may  result  from  the  ultimate  spending  of these 
moneys); on the other hand, payments made for the purchase of  goods and services 
(a large part of administrative expenditure) increase the resources available in the 
recipient country only for a part of  their total amount (the value added generated in 
the country).  Between these two extremes lie different categories of expenditure 
with different degrees of "benefit" for the recipient that make it difficult to either 
exclude some items of  expenditure or to regroup them in meaningful categories. 
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Moreover, important definitional problems undermine the reliability of  simple measures 
of  budgetary balances: 
•  first, depending on which contributions (traditional own resources, traditional own 
resources  redistributed  among  Member  States  according  to  a  conventional  key, 
total own resources) are included in the calculation it is certain to arrive at different 
estimates of  the balance; 
•  secondly, in a similar manner, EU expenditure can be defined to include or exclude 
such  items  as  administrative  expenditure,  external  expenditure  conventionally 
reapportioned by Member State etc.; 
•  thirdly,  since  an  important fraction  of total  expenditure cannot be accurately or 
completely  identified  (either because  it  is  external  expenditure,  or because  the 
ultimate beneficiary cannot be established,  as  mentioned previously) the  sum of 
balances of  the Member States will not sum to zero;  adjusting them to sum to zero 
or not, the resulting budgetary balances are inaccurate measures of  Member States' 
transactions through the EU budget; and, 
•  finally,  while  it  is  possible  to  use  either  cash  or  accruals  data,  the  resulting 
budgetary balances will be distorted by carry-over surpluses or deficits which play 
an important role in determining current-year contributions. 
The compensation paid to  the United Kingdom offers an example of the choices that 
must be made when choosing any definition and of the questionable character of  many 
the assumptions that must be made.  The principle of the  compensation is  that the 
United Kingdom receives a rebate equal to two thirds of its negative budgetary balance 
calculated  in  the  following  way:  the  difference  between  the  share  of the  United 
Kingdom in the VAT and GNP contribution and the share of  this country in "allocated 
expenditure" is multiplied by the total of  operational expenditure. 
This definition makes many implicit assumptions.  The exclusion of traditional own 
resources  is  equivalent  to  assuming  that  their  economic  cost  is  distributed  among 
Member States in proportion to their combined VAT and GNP contributions.  On the 
expenditure side, the concept of "allocated expenditure" excludes from the calculation 
expenditure made outside the territory of the Union and some minor items which are 
either  conceptually  impossible  to  allocate  or  that  would  require  too  great  an 
administrative  effort.  On  the  other  hand,  "allocated  expenditure"  includes 
administrative expenditure. 
There is no single definition of  budgetary balance.  This ambiguity inevitably makes 
possible the design of  various methods of  approximating the budgetary benefits from 
membership in the EU, and the choice of  particular method often reflects the desire to 
highlight a particular point of  view or to defend a specific issue. 
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5.  Trends in relative prosperity in the EU in recent years 
In recent discussions of budgetary balances,  attention has been drawn to the relative 
prosperity of Member States and references have been made to the conclusions of the 
European Council meeting in Fontainebleau which link the possibility of granting a 
budgetary correction to a Member State experiencing a severe imbalance in relation to 
its relative prosperity 
4
•  In this context some confusion has appeared between the two 
distinct concepts of  relative prosperity and contributive capacity. 
The first concept (relative prosperity) aims at determining how well off are the citizens 
of a country, (or of a region) compared to the EU average.  This comparison requires 
that:  i)  each individual Member State's actual per capita average income be converted 
into a common numeraire to  ensure comparability and ii)  on the assumption that the 
income  is  spent  in  the  home  country  or region,  that  incomes  be  adjusted  for  the 
differences in the price levels.  This result is achieved by converting nominal income 
data into real  income  data in a common numeraire using Purchasing Power Parities 
(PPP).  The resulting data in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) allow comparisons of 
the domestic prosperity of  the average citizens of  a country or of  a region relative to the 
EU average.  Such data are relevant,  for example, when choosing the regions which 
qualify for regional aid or when assessing the relative prosperity of a country in the 
context, for instance, of  the application of  the Fontainebleau conclusions. 
The second concept (contributive capacity) can be used to  determine the capacity of 
citizens or of  countries to pay for a given expenditure.  The cost of  financing an action 
(an infrastructure project,  a  seminar,  etc.)  in a given place,  or of making  a  specific 
purchase of  goods and services, is the same for all financiers or buyers.  In the domestic 
currency of each buyer or financier, however, the cost will depend on the current level 
of  the exchange rate, since the current exchange rate constitutes the terms in which one 
country's  income  purchases  international  goods  and  services,  including  EU budget 
contributions.  Exchange rate fluctuations against the currency in which the purchase is 
made or the action financed affect significantly their domestic-currency cost.  The best 
way to assess the capacity of  a country to pay in an international context, or the capacity 
to  contribute to  the EU budget, is by using actual nominal GNP  data converted in a 
common currency  (e.g.  Ecus)  using  current  exchange  rates.  Whereas  the  relative 
prosperity  is  best  assessed  comparing  GNP  per  capita  (converted  in  a  common 
numeraire at PPP), the contributive capacity of  a country depends on its total GNP. 
Over the last decade,  substantial changes in the relative position of various Member 
States  according  to  both  these  concepts  have  taken  place  (e. g.  Finland,  Sweden, 
Germany, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark; see tables 5 and 6). 
4  "However,  it has  been  decided  that any  Member State sustaining  a budgetary  burden  which  is  excessive  in 
relation to its relative prosperity may benefit from a correction at the appropriate time". 
9-10-97 - 11 -
The concept of  "relative prosperity" measures how well off  average citizens are when 
they spend their income in their country or region.  This is best assessed by PPP 
comparisons and should be used when identifying the regions eligible for aid or when 
assessing  the  relative prosperity of a  country.  When  assessing  the  ability  to 
contribute to the EU  budget, the relevant concept is the "contributive capacity" which 
is properly measured by nominal GNP data converted in a common currency using 
current exchange rates. 
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Table 3 
Effects of the reduction in the relative weight of the VAT 
resource on the "equity" of contributions 
a)  Differences between Member States' shares in VAT payments and in Community 
GNP  (negative figures indicate lower VAT shares, positive figures higher VAT shares) 
B  DK  D  G  E  F  IR  I  L  NL  A  p  Fl  s  UK 
R  L  N 
198  - - - - 0.7  1.15  0.0  - 0.0  0.0  -- - - -- 1.8 
8  0.15  0.27  0.34  0.0  9  7  2.18  2  4  0.9  9 
4  8 
199  - - 0.11  - 0.3  0.83  0.0  - 0.0  0.1  -- 0.1  -- - 1.7 
0  0.31  0.27  0.0  4  7  2.79  2  2  2  7 
3 
199  - - 1.13  0.0  0.6  0.15  0.0  - 0.0  0.0  - 0.1  -- -- 0.8 
2  0.30  0.20  6  7  9  2.61  3  0  7  1 
199  - - 2.62  - 0.2  0.09  0.0  - 0.0  - -- 0.1  - -- 0.9 
4  0.42  0.28  0.0  2  9  3.23  3  0.1  7  1 
3  7 
199  - - 1.94  0.0  0.0  - 0.0  - 0.0  0.2  0.1  0.0  - - 1.1 
6  0.45  0.20  9  3  0.02  5  2.84  3  3  1  9  0.0  0.1  7 
9  5 
b)  VAT payments to the EU budget as a percentage of EU GNP and as a percentage 
of total own resources 
I  ~  I  I  T 
1989 i 1990 
I 
1991  :  1992  :  1993 i 1994  ;  1995 i 1996  ;  1997 
I 
I 
'  I  I  . 
% ofEU GNP 
1  r 
;  0.59  l  0.62  :  0.59  1  0.52  ~  0.50  0.63  :  0.60  :  0.59  :  0.61 
I  ~  I  I 
-T 
% of Resources  64.0  :  70.1  : 59.0  : 61.0  : 53.2  : 53.2  : 54.8  : 50.5 
I  -- --
I  : 
c)  Differences between Member States' shares in VAT and GNP payments and in 
Community GNP  (negative figures indicate lower payments shares, positive figures 
higher payments shares) 
B  DK  D  G  E  F  IR  I  L  NL  A  p  Fl  s  UK 
R  L  N 
1988  - - - - 0.6  0.94  0.0  - 0.0  0.0  -- - -- - 1.53 
0.1  0.2  0.28  0.0  5  6  1.77  2  3  0.8 
2  2  3  0 
1990  - - 0.11  - 0.3  0.83  0.0  - 0.0  0.1  -- 0.1  -- -- 1.77 
0.3  0.2  0.0  4  7  2.79  2  2  2 
1  7  3 
9-10-97 - 13-
1992  - - 0.91  0.0  0.5  0.12  0.0  - 0.0  0.0  -- 0.1  - -- 0.65 
0.2  0.1  5  4  7  2.10  2  0  4 
4  6 
1994  - - 1.74  - 0.1  0.06  0.0  - 0.0  - -- 0.1  -- -- 0.60 
0.2  0.1  0.0  5  6  2.14  2  0.1  1 
8  9  2  1 
1996  - - 1.22  0.0  0.0  - 0.0  - 0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  - - 0.74 
0.2  0.1  6  2  0.01  3  1.79  2  5  7  6  0.0  0.1 
8  2  6  0 
VAT and GNP payments on an accrual basis before UK correction.  Source: Commission services 
9-10-97 - 14-
Table4 
Member States' shares in payments of TOR and Community GNP 
(1996) 
B  DK  D  G  E  F  IR  I  L  NL  A  p  Fl  s  UK 
R  L  N 
TOR  7.3  2.0  25.8  1.1  4.6  11.4  1.5  7.7  0.1  11.  1.9  1.0  1.1  2.8  19.9 
9 
GNP  3.1  2.0  27.4  1.5  6.9  18.1  0.7  14.1  0.2  4.6  2.6  1.2  1.4  2.8  13.5 
Table 5 
Gross national product at current market prices per head of population 
(until1990: EUR-15 excluding East Germany= 100;  from1991: EUR-15 including new Lander 
= 100) 
ECU 
1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
B  121.  103.  101.  104.  102.  104.  106.  108.  115.  118.  121.  117.  112. 
3  8  0  0  9  0  0  6  3  0  6  2  3 
DK  126.  124.  131.  139.  134.  127.  124.  125.  132.  135.  140.  138.  136. 
1  6  1  7  9  8  3  8  7  0  4  8  7 
D  131.  126.  129.  132.  129.  127.  114.  119.  126.  127.  131.  124.  118. 
9  5  9  4  2  3  7  6  9  7  0  7  9 
GR  52.1  58.4  53.5  43.1  42.6  44.0  46.7  46.6  48.7  48.8  49.8  52.3  53.9 
E  55.8  55.5  52.3  53.7  58.3  66.7  71.4  71.6  65.8  62.1  63.4  65.2  62.5 
F  123.  120.  115.  118.  113.  111.  110.  111.  115.  116.  117.  115.  111. 
8  6  7  9  2  4  5  2  7  2  3  6  4 
IRL  57.7  64.2  61.9  61.4  58.0  61.3  62.7  64.1  64.7  67.0  68.8  73.3  80.9 
I  79.8  83.8  92.7  95.8  97.1  101.  105.  102.  91.5  88.8  83.2  91.4  92.2 
1  4  4 
L  157.  163.  171.  179.  173.  184.  192.  191.  197.  199.  202.  195.  186. 
8  1  4  4  3  0  4  7  6  7  4  7  2 
NL  120.  115.  112.  111.  102.  100.  101.  102.  110.  111.  114.  111.  107. 
9  8  0  1  9  7  5  8  1  8  1  5  6 
A  103.  106.  109.  111.  109.  109.  110.  112.  120.  121.  124.  119.  113. 
1  1  3  7  5  2  1  8  7  7  2  2  6 
p  28.5  29.9  26.2  29.6  31.5  35.8  40.4  45.3  44.9  43.7  45.0  45.4  45.6 
FIN  105.  122.  130.  126.  136.  139.  123.  98.3  85.3  93.6  105.  102.  102. 
6  1  1  1  1  5  4  0  3  3 
9-10-97 - 15-
s  149.  142.  144.  140.  139.  137.  141.  133.  110.  109.  110.  117.  114. 
9  1  5  9  8  8  9  9  0  9  8  8  9 
UK  95.2  102.  98.6  89.5  96.2  89.1  91.3  87.5  86.9  88.4  83.5  85.4  101. 
9  2 
EUR-15  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100. 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
9-10-97 - 16-
Table 6 
Gross national product at current market prices per head of population 
(until1990: EUR-15 excluding East Germany= 100;  from1991: EUR-15 including new Lander 
= 100) 
PPS 
1980  1982  1984  1986  1988  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997 
B  108.  107.  106.  104.  104.  105.  109.  111.  116.  116.  115.  115.  115. 
5  9  8  1  7  3  3  9  7  7  7  7  7 
DK  102.  103.  106.  109.  104.  100.  104.  102.  109.  111.  113.  114.  115. 
9  7  7  6  6  6  7  6  1  1  3  5  2 
D  117.  116.  119.  118.  116.  117.  107.  109.  109.  110.  110.  109.  109. 
8  4  0  2  1  8  4  5  0  4  5  6  4 
GR  66.6  65.2  62.8  61.4  59.9  59.3  62.3  63.3  66.1  66.6  67.3  67.8  68.1 
E  70.0  69.7  69.0  69.5  72.1  74.2  78.9  76.9  77.7  75.1  76.3  76.6  77.1 
F  112.  115.  111.  110.  109.  109.  113.  111.  108.  107.  107.  107.  107. 
9  3  7  1  5  7  2  1  9  4  4  3  1 
IRL  62.3  62.3  59.6  58.0  58.6  64.3  69.0  71.6  73.4  77.4  80.1  85.3  89.0 
I  102.  101.  101.  102.  102.  101.  105.  104.  102.  103.  103.  103.  102. 
1  9  9  4  9  9  6  9  4  1  7  1  2 
L  146.  168.  173.  181.  176.  185.  196.  192.  188.  184.  182.  179.  179. 
7  7  5  5  7  2  7  0  2  0  1  3  5 
NL  105.  102.  102.  102.  98.4  101.  102.  102.  104.  105.  107.  108.  109. 
1  3  7  7  3  7  5  6  6  1  9  6 
A  104.  106.  106.  105.  103.  105.  108.  109.  112.  112.  110.  110.  109. 
9  5  1  2  5  8  9  1  3  2  8  1  3 
p  53.6  53.1  49.4  52.3  55.7  58.9  62.8  64.1  67.5  68.0  67.8  68.3  69.2 
FIN  94.9  98.3  99.1  99.1  101.  99.9  90.6  83.1  86.3  87.5  93.2  95.4  97.7 
3 
s  110.  110.  111.  111.  109.  104.  102.  96.4  95.2  95.1  97.0  96.4  96.5 
9  3  8  0  1  5  0 
UK  97.0  97.4  99.6  101.  103.  99.5  96.3  98.1  99.2  98.8  96.0  96.5  96.8 
5  5 
EUR-15  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100.  100. 
0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
9-10-97 -
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